The performance of every legal system is pegged on its ability to accurately adjudicate cases and determine guilt and innocence based on the evidence presented. Nonetheless, history is replete with unresolved cases, contested judgments, and flawed evidence that passed judicial tests. This shows a disregard for a fundamental principle that results in a miscarriage of justice. The failure in the justice system not only inflicts irreparable damage on the wrongly accused but also erodes public confidence in the criminal justice system. There are too many cases that demonstrate the complexity and problem of the presented evidence. This discussion explores the difficult relationship that exists between evidence and miscarriages of justice in the United Kingdom, specifically analyzing the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] and the case of Guildford Four and Maguire Seven as an example.[1] These two cases are inextricably related and explicitly show the underlying miscarriage of justice. The discussion will focus on the R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004], explaining how the evidence flaw led to a thoughtful injustice and how the subsequent evidence necessitated its rectification. This is similar to the Guildford Four and Maguire Seven. By drawing on the theoretical perception from the evidence law and analysis of each case, this essay will explain, evaluate, and present the pivot of evidence’s role in causing and correcting these significant miscarriages of justice.[2]

Problem of Evidence in Miscarriage of Justice: A Theoretical Perspective
The pursuit of justice is a fundamental quest for truth, though Ho postulates in A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in Search of Truth that this pursuit has many challenges.[3] Legal fact-finding revolves around a system of rules and procedures designed to uphold justice and ensure fairness, but it can also inadvertently block the truth.[4] The nature of evidence is often fragmented, relies on humans’ interpretation, and is ambiguous, presenting a significant handle to the prosecutors and the defendant. According to Dahlman, Redmayne, and Roberts (2017), in their article Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, they argue that evidence is not always conclusive and more often requires inferences to be drawn, which gives way to errors and misinterpretation.[5] Thus, miscarriage of justice occurs when the evidence presented is unreliable, misinterpreted, or deliberately manipulated, leading to a flawed case conclusion about guilt. The challenge is laid bare by the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system, in which most of the focus shifts from an objective search for facts to contest against opposing narratives, with each party presenting evidence to make the case for their bargain. Moreover, cognitive biases among judges, investigators, prosecutors, and juries can, in certain circumstances, unconsciously influence the examination of the evidence, leading to unjustified wrongful convictions.[6] In the case of R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004], the Guildford Fours and Maguire Seven explicitly demonstrate these theoretical problems, showing how apparently compelling evidence can disguise and musk an injustice.[7]
The Case of Mr. Mullen: An Example of Miscarriage of Justices
The Mullen case arose due to an explosion that occurred in 1990.[8] Mullen was accused and convicted of the incident and served nearly ten years of incarceration. However, his conviction was overturned by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the prosecutor abused the legal process, notably that Mullen was unlawfully deported from Zimbabwe into the UK. The Court of Appeal argued that the British government breached international law by bringing Mullen to face justice in the UK.[9] Though Mullen’s conviction was overturned, the House of Lords decided to demand Mullen’s compensation.[10] Under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the law does not allow compensation where the quashing of a conviction resulted from the abuse of the judicial process and not a failure in the trial processes or introduction of new evidence related to the conviction of guilt or innocence.[11] According to the Court of Appeal decision, the judges emphasized that Section 133 of the Justice Act 1988 requires a defendant to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice within the confines of the Act, which in the Mullen case was not met.[12]
The Case of the Guildford Four: A Description of the Miscarriage of Justices
The Guildford pub bombing that happened on October 5, 1974, resulted in the death of five people, triggering a massive police investigation into the causes of the incident.[13] In the following weeks, police arrested four individuals, Gerry Conlon, Paddy Joe, Carole Richardson, and Paul Hill, and charged them with the bombing. After a vigorous case, the four accused, despite maintaining their innocence and presenting alibis, were convicted to life imprisonment in 1975. The prosecutor of this case heavily relied on confessions that were allegedly obtained from the four accused and other forensic evidence that linked them to the explosive used in the bombing. For instance, Gerry Conlon, in his confession, asserted that he was coerced using threat and intimidation. In addition, the forensic evidence used in the case involved traces of nitroglycerine, which the prosecution alluded to connect the victim to the handling of the explosives. Throughout their imprisonment, the Guildford Four and their supporters relentlessly campaigned for their release, arguing that they were wrongly accused and the evidence against them was flawed. This case became a national rallying call and a symbol of injustice within the English legal system, leading to a protracted legal confrontation and heightened public scrutiny. The Mullen case focused on the compensation directly from the same flawed investigation into the Guildford bombings. As the Guildford Four, Millen was wrongly accused and convicted as part of the “Maguire Seven” using similarly questionable forensic evidence related to nitroglycerine traces.
How Evidence Caused the Miscarriage of Justice in the Mullen and Guildford Four Cases
In the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the court of appeal quashed Mr. Mullen’s conviction due to the abuse of executive power in his deportation from Zimbabwe into the UK to face trial.[14] Though the evidence presented during the court proceeding was not proven to be unreliable or false in the sense of a wrongful conviction based on factual error, the issue that the court found wanting was the British authorities acting in contravention of the law to bring Mullen before the court. The jury found this process to be a fundamental flaw of the judicial process. The Court of Appeal ([2000] QB 520 at 535) ruled that the state failed and ignored to abide by the law while producing Mullen in court.[15] Thus, the unlawful act by the state that preceded the presentation of evidence in court was at the core of the miscarriage of justice of Mr. Mullen rather than the tenacity of the evidence presented before the court. The Mullen case presents a different facet of the miscarriages of justice compared to the Guildford Four. For instance, while the Guildford Four trial centered on flawed, threatening, and coerced evidence, Mullen’s trial focused on prosecutors’ abuse of executive power before conviction. The Court of Appeal noted that a miscarriage of justice is not pegged on proving innocence; it can also include circumstances where the process has serious irregularities and a person “should not have been convicted.” Nonetheless, in the Mullen trial, the mistrial was not with the evidence provided in court a trial, but with the circumstances that led him to be trialed in the UK in the first place.
The collapse of the Guilford Four appeal was a result of a miscarriage of justice primarily contributed by key types of evidence, flawed forensic science, and coerced confessions. First, the confession obtained from the four accused was highly suspect and could not sustain a conviction. In his autobiography Stolen Innocence, Gerry Conlon points out the intense threat, pressure, and psychological manipulation he endured during police interrogation, leading him to confess to crimes he did not commit falsely.[16] The other accused also reported similar accounts, highlighting incidences of coercive interrogation methods that the police employed. As such, this dubious confession formed the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case and heavily influenced the judge’s perception of guilt. Secondly, the forensic evidence the prosecutor relied on during the trial pointed out that the presence of nitroglycerine in the hands of the accused was found to be unreliable. Later scientific advancement and re-examination of the evidence found that the tests relied on at the time were disposed to give false positive results and, therefore, could not definitely link the accused to the Guilford bombing. Moreover, more evidence had emerged during the appeal, indicating that the criminal investigation department might have faked the forensic samples. The damning evidence of confessions and forensic reports finding created a powerful argument of guilt that overshadowed the alibis the accused provided, ultimately leading to wrongful convictions. The failure of the justice legal system to analyze and scrutinize the circumstances of the accused confessions and the challenges of forensic science at the time directly caused a profound miscarriage of justice.
How Evidence Led to The Ratification of the Miscarriage of Justice
The miscarriage of justice in the Mullen case came through the unlawful legal challenges that unearthed the illegal nature of his deportation. Thus, upon review of the case, the Court of Appeal established the severity of the state department’s overreach. One of the key factors that led the jury to overturn the conviction was the disclosure and judicial reflection of the circumstances of Mullen’s apprehension and presentation in court. It could be upheld that the British authorities had acted and assisted Mullen in his deportation through unlawful means, contravening both Zimbabwean and international law.[17] Thus, the revelation of the state’s actions in circumventing legal extradition procedures was enough for the Court of Appeal to quell Mullen’s conviction. Unlike the case of Guildford Four, which was based on new forensic evidence and retraction of enforced testimony, Mullen’s conviction decision was a miscarriage of justice due to an illegal act by the executive that undermined the fairness of charging him for trial.[18]
The Court of Appeal’s eventual overturning of the conviction of the Guildford Four in 1989 was a result of a different nature of evidence. After years of agitation by the families and the legal team, inconsistencies and flaws emerged in the original investigation, especially the discovery of undisclosed police files, which played a pivotal role. These files revealed that the police had knowledge of the alibis of some of the accused but failed to investigate properly or suppress this information.[19] For example, in the case of Gerry Colon, he had an alibi that was thrown away by the police, which contradicted the prosecution’s narrative and cast doubt on the integrity of the investigation. In addition, the advancement of forensic science disapproved of the original prosecution’s narrative on nitroglycerine contamination.
Evaluation of Evidence
In Mullen’s apprehension, the strength of circumstantial evidence is the documented actions of the British government in enforcing his unlawful deportation. This evidence is laid bare in a direct challenge to the judicial process, integrity, and the rule of law. On the central, Mullen’s claim for compensation shows the weakness of his appeal, and the House of Lords argued that the quashing of conviction resulted from procedural impropriety and not necessarily on proof of innocence of the crime. As Lord Steyn argued in the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal flopped conviction due to abuse of executive power and not on a failure of the trial proceeding regarding evidence of accused conspiracy.[20] This distinction was important for the House of Lords in declining to offer statutory compensation under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which guaranteed the accused of a miscarriage of justice to seek reprieve for wrongful detention.[21] In the Guilford Four case, there are stark displays of strengths and weaknesses of the various types of evidence in the justice legal system. For instance, the initial reliance on false confessions is a dangerous incidence, particularly for victims subjected to intense pressure, threats, and psychological manipulation.[22] The jury is known to acknowledge the importance of confession in court proceedings and, as such, carry a strong persuasive to a jury, more often overshadowing other forms of evidence even in cases where the confession is questionable. Thus, the Guildford case underscores the need for rigorous safeguards while police conduct investigations by including secure recording in the presence of the accused counsel. Similarly, the prosecution’s reliance on flawed forensic evidence can be a powerful tool for fact-finding when the method is reliable, robust, and subject to scrutiny. However, Guildford is a cautionary example of the dangers of using scientific evidence at face value more often when it aligns with the preconceived idea of guilt.
Conclusion
The R v Secretary of State for the Home Department postulates a distinct form of a miscarriage of justice rooted in the abuse of the authority’s power rather than the precarious unreliability of evidence presented during court proceedings. Though the evidence of Mullen’s crime was not a case in his appeal, the unlawful means by which he was presented to the court was questionable and was enough proof to terminate his conviction without compensation, as he demanded. The revelation of the unlawful deportation was so profound that it demonstrated that the integrity of the judicial process superseded the evidence brought in court. On the other hand, the case of the Guildford Four demonstrates the dire consequences of the miscarriage of justice and the crucial role that evidence presented in court plays in occurrence and rectification. The wrongful conviction of the four co-accused was primarily grounded on coerced confessions and false forensic evidence, highlighting the inherent weakness in these types of evidence when not thoroughly scrutinized. On the contrary, the acquittal of the Guildford Four as a result of uncovering the suppressed evidence and the growth of forensic science shows the invaluable power of new evidence to correct past injustices.
For this article on “Miscarriages of Justice and Evidence,” the following YouTube videos offer valuable insights:
1. Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science by John Morgan
This video delves into the role of forensic science in wrongful convictions, highlighting how errors can occur at various stages, from crime scene investigation to courtroom testimony.
2. Forensic Investigation for Cold Cases & Miscarriages of Justice
This presentation explores the challenges associated with investigating cold cases and the potential for miscarriages of justice, emphasizing the importance of evidence integrity throughout the investigative process.
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References
[1] R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
[2] Weronika Dziȩgielewska. “Why Are We Bound by Evidence? On The Normative Stance of Legal Proof.” In Theory of Legal Evidence-Evidence in Legal Theory. [2022] CSIP, 73
[3] HL Ho, A philosophy of evidence law: Justice in the search for truth (Oxford University Press 2008)
[4] Baosheng Zhang, Dan Yun, and David Caruso, Dan Yun, and David Caruso. “The role of fact-finding in legal reasoning.” [2017] PULJ 239
[5] C Dahlman, Redmayne, M, & Roberts, P, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press 2017, p.5).
[6] Charles Gardner Geyh, “The dimensions of judicial impartiality.” [2013] FLR 494
[7] R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
[8] Gerry Conlon, Stolen Innocence (Grafton Books 1990)
[9] Rosemary Foot, “The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation and Embedded ideas”, (2007), Human Rights Quarterly 505.
[10] R (on the application of Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 18; [2005] 1 A.C. 1 (House of Lords).
[11] Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 133
[12] Ibid
[13] Dipul Yadav, “Efficiency of Lower Evidentiary Requirement in Special Legislations Case Study: Trial of Guildford Four and Maguire Seven” (July 14, 2023).
[14] Mullen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 18, [2004] 3 All ER 297 (HL)
[15] Court of Appeal ([2000] QB 520 at 535)
[16] Gerry Conlon, Stolen Innocence (Grafton Books 1990)
[17] Court of Appeal, [2000] QB 520, para 35
[18] House of Lords, [2004] UKHL 18, para 8
[19] Rebecca Helem, “Evaluating witness testimony: Juror knowledge, false memory, and the utility of evidence-based directions.” [2021] TIJEP 277.
[20] R (on the application of Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 18; [2005] 1 A.C. 1 (House of Lords)
[21] Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 133
[22] GH Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony (John Wiley & Sons 2003).