## The Regime-Hold elections-Pursue moderate policy-Democratic consolidation

Problem Set 3

1.(a) Based on the cardinal payoffs shown in Figure 8.8, write down the preference ordering for (a) the Regime, (b) the moderate Religious Party, and (c) the radical Religious Party over the three possible outcomes.

• the Regime-Hold elections-Pursue moderate policy-Democratic consolidation
• the moderate Religious Party-regime-Hold elections-Religious Party-Pursue moderate policy-Democratic consolidation
• the radical Religious Party-regime-Hold elections-Religious Party-Pursue moderate policy-Democratic consolidation

(b) Solve the subgame on the left, where the Religious Party is moderate, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? What is the expected outcome? What are the payoffs that each player receives?

The subgame perfect equilibrium as if there were no uncertainty is (Hold elections; Pursue moderate policy), the expected outcome will be Democratic consolidation. The payoff will be (25, 25).

(c) Solve the subgame on the right, where the Religious Party is radical, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? What is the expected outcome? What are the payoffs that each player receives?

The is subgame perfect equilibrium is  (Cancel elections; Pursue radical policy). The expected outcome will be continued dictatorship. The player who chooses to continue dictatorship will receive (20,5) as payoff.

(d)What is the expected payoff for the Regime from “Cancel elections”?

The expected payoff for the Regime from “Cancel elections”

will be 20, and the dictatorship will be continued.

20*p + 20*(1-p) = 20

(e)What is the expected payoff for the Regime from “Hold elections”?

The expected payoff for the Regime from “Hold elections” will be 25*p + 5*(1-p) = 20p +5.

(f) Use the expected payoffs from the two previous questions to calculate the critical probability at which the Regime will choose to hold elections rather than cancel them.

Regime would hold elections if the expected payoff from holding elections is greater than the payoff from canceling elections”, meaning 20p + 5 > 20, thus p > .75

(g) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.75, will it choose to hold elections, will it cancel elections, or will it be indifferent between these two actions? Explain.

When p equals .75, the payoff for Regime from holding elections equals the payoff from canceling elections. So it will be indifferent between them.

(h)If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.8, will it choose to hold elections, will it cancel elections, or will it be indifferent between these two actions? Explain.

When p equals .8, the payoff for Regime from holding elections is 20 * 0.8 + 5 = 21, which is greater than the payoff from canceling elections. So it will hold elections.

(i) If the Regime believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability of 0.5, will it choose to hold elections, will it cancel elections, or will it be indifferent between these two actions? Explain.

When p equals .5, the payoff for Regime from holding election is 20 * 0.5 + 5 = 15, which is smaller than the payoff from canceling elections. So it will cancel elections.

(j) If you represented a moderate religious party poised to win the elections, would you want the Regime to believe that your party was moderate or radical?

If I represent a moderate religious party poised to win the elections, I would want the Regime to believe that my party is moderate.

(k) If you represented a radical religious party poised to win the elections, would you want the Regime to believe that your party was moderate or radical?

If I represent a radical religious party poised to win the elections, I would lie and want the Regime to believe that my party is moderate.

(l) If you solved the game correctly, you will find that the Regime will hold elections as long as it believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a high enough probability. If there is some uncertainty on the part of the Regime and you are representing a moderate religious party that wants the elections to go ahead, why might it not be enough for you to simply announce to the Regime that your party is a moderate religious party and not a radical one?

The critical probability matters. If the regime is really uncertain about the nature of the party, it may suspect that a radical party is masked as a moderate party to persuade the regime to hold elections. Only when p is larger than .75, and the party announce that its moderate, will the regime hold elections

2.2. (5 points) On September 17, 2011, protesters occupied Zuccotti Park in the nancial district of New York as part of a movement that became known as Occupy Wall Street (OWS). Many of the protesters had been inspired by the popular uprisings that had occurred in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011. The OWS protesters were opposed to what they perceived to be the undue inuence of banks and multinational corporations on the political system. They believed that the wealthiest 1 percent of society had a disproportionate share of capital and political inuence, and they used the slogan We are the 99% to highlight the problem of social and economic inequality. The OWS led to the creation of the international Occupy Movement, which has organized protests in dozens of countries around the world. The occupation of Zuccotti Park ended on November 15, 2011, when the protesters were forcibly removed by the police. Imagine that you are discussing issues of inequality and the power of the nancial sector with some of the Occupy Wall Street protesters in the fall of 2011. How would you explain the implications of the structural dependence of the state on capital to someone who doesn’t understand why left-wing parties do not always expropriate the rich when they come to power?

Because although they are 99% of the population but they belongs to “labor” class, they don’t really make big decisions. They devote more of they time on investing, how to make the maximum profits under the limited time period, unlike them, the rest of the 1% spends their time deciding how to shape the economy to benefit themselves the most.

3.

(a) Guinea Bissau

(b) Iraq under Saddam Hussein (pre-2003)

(c) The United States in 1776

(d) The United Arab Emirates

(e) Chile under Augusto Pinochet

(f) Argentina

4. Suppose that a political leader raises \$1 billion in tax revenue. Assume that the leader can supply public goods worth \$2,000 to each individual in society if he spends all of this tax revenue on providing public goods. Assume also that the size of the winning coalition is 250,000. With all of this in mind, answer the following questions.

(a) If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount?

(b) Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this situation? Why?

(c) Now suppose that the size of the winning coalition is 750,000. Keeping everything else the same, answer the following questions.

(d) If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount?

(e) Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this new situation? Why?

(f) Based on the answers you have given and the description of selectorate theory in this chapter, why is providing public goods a more ecient way for leaders in democracies to stay in power?

(g) Based on the answers you have given and the description of selectorate theory in this chapter, why is providing private goods a more ecient way for leaders in dictatorships to stay in power?